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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Natalie Jean Miramontes appeals from the judgment of conviction entered upon her
conditional guilty plea to possession of methamphetamine. Miramontes asserts the district court
erred when it denied her motion to suppress. (Appellant’s brief, p.7.)
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Probation Officers Raynee Myler and Matt LaVallee conducted a probationary check on
the home of Christine Evans, a participant in mental health court. (R., pp.133-34.) Upon arriving
at Evans’s home, Officer Myler knocked on the door and saw Evans through a window. (11/27/18
Tr., p.6, Ls.10-14.) Evans saw the officers and put her finger up indicating that she needed a
minute. (11/27/18 Tr., p.8, Ls.12-20.) She then walked to the back of the house before returning
to let the officers in. (11/27/18 Tr., p.8, Ls.20-23.)
Officer Myler suspected other persons were present in the home. (R., p.134.) Upon
entering, Officer Myler immediately walked to the back of the house to verify her suspicion. (R.,
p.134; 11/27/18 Tr., p.8, L.24 – p.9, L.1.) As she did so, she observed a woman exiting into the
backyard through a back door, hunched over carrying a bag. (R., p.134; 11/27/18 Tr., p.9, Ls.624.) Officer Myler followed the woman and ordered her to stop three times. (R., p.134; 11/27/18
Tr., p.9, L.25 – p.10, L.11.) The woman stopped after Officer Myler’s third command and dropped
the bag she was carrying. (R., p.134; 11/27/18 Tr., p.10, Ls.19-25.) Officer Myler asked the
woman to come back inside the house and to identify herself. (R., p.134; 11/27/18 Tr., p.10, Ls.2425.) The woman came back inside and identified herself as Natalie Miramontes. (11/27/18 Tr.,
p.11, L.24 – p.12, L.8; p.13, Ls.3-4.) Miramontes told Officer Myler that she had been living in a
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spare bedroom in Evans’s home for about a week. (R., p.134; 11/27/18 Tr., p.12, Ls.2-8; p.14,
L.25 – p.15, L.9.)
Officer Myler then asked Miramontes for her identification. (R., p.134; 11/27/18 Tr., p.12,
Ls.9-16.) Miramontes told Officer Myler that her ID was in her purse. (11/27/18 Tr., p.13, L.18
– p.14, L.1.) She tried to walk past Officer Myler toward the bag she had dropped, but Officer
Myler prevented her from doing so for officer safety reasons. (11/27/18 Tr., p.13, L.18 – p.14,
L.1; p.37, Ls.3-24.) Instead, Officer Myler had Officer LaVallee collect the bag and its contents
from the backyard and bring it inside. (R., p.134; 11/27/18 Tr., p.41, Ls.4-21; p.59, L.2 – p.62,
L.11; State’s Exs. 2-4.) Miramontes told the officers that her ID was in the pink floral pattern bag.
(R., p.134; 11/27/18 Tr., p.14, Ls.2-5; p.42, L.18 – p.43, L.1; p.59, Ls.16-22.) Officer LaVallee
opened a pink floral print bag and saw needles, plastic packaging, and a fake battery that contained
methamphetamine. (R., p.134; 11/27/18 Tr., p.62, Ls.12-18; p.85, L.6 – p.86, L.6; 5/9/18 Tr., p.30,
Ls.4-8; State’s Ex. 4.) The officers froze the scene, detained Miramontes, and called for local
police to respond. (R., p.134; 11/27/18 Tr., p.15, L.10 – p.17, L.12; p.64, L.22 – p.65, L.9.)
Officer Leach, a local police officer, responded a few minutes later. (R., p.135; 11/27/18
Tr., p.16, Ls.18-24; p.80, L.22 – p.81, L.18.) Officers Leach and Myler searched the back bedroom
that Miramontes had been staying in.

(11/27/18 Tr., p.83, Ls.2-12.)

They discovered

methamphetamine as well as various items of drug paraphernalia such as plastic baggies, bindles,
pipes, a glass bong, syringes, and a torch. (R., p.135; 11/27/18 Tr., p.83, L.13 – p.84, L.1.) Officer
Leach also searched the bags Miramontes had dropped in the backyard and found a glass bong, a
syringe that contained a dark substance, and Miramontes’s ID. (R., p.135; 11/27/18 Tr., p.84, L.8
– p.88, L.11; State’s Ex. 5-6.) Officer Leach read Miramontes her Miranda 1 rights and asked
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Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2

which items belonged to her. (R., p.135; 11/27/18 Tr., p.88, L.12 – p.90, L.10.) Miramontes
claimed ownership of the bag that contained the glass bong, and the bag that contained the syringe
and her ID; she again admitted that she had been staying in Evans’s home for about five days.
(11/27/18 Tr., p.89, L.16 – p.91, L.13.)
The state charged Miramontes with possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver.
(R., pp.41-42. 2) Miramontes filed a motion to suppress arguing that her constitutional right
“against unreasonable seizure was violated.” (R., pp.63-65 (emphasis added).) The district court
held an evidentiary hearing on the suppression motion before the parties submitted any briefing.
(R., pp.66-69; see generally 11/27/18 Tr., pp.4-97.) The parties submitted their respective briefs
in the weeks after the evidentiary hearing. (R., pp.73-98.)
At the court’s request, a second hearing on the motion to suppress was held. (2/25/19 Tr.,
p.6, Ls.4-6; see R., p.99.) Due to the temporal difference between the evidence initially discovered
in Miramontes’s purse and the evidence subsequently discovered in the bedroom, the court sought
clarification from Miramontes regarding what evidence she was seeking to have suppressed. (R.,
pp.135-36; 2/25/19 Tr., p.7, Ls.8-19.) Following the hearing, Miramontes filed a supplemental
brief arguing that both the evidence found in her purse and the evidence found in the bedroom
should be suppressed because neither the attenuation doctrine, nor the inevitable discovery
doctrine, nor the independent source doctrine applied. (R., pp.102-16.) The state also filed a
supplemental brief. (R., pp.117-32.) The state argued the evidence discovered was not subject to
suppression because the exceptions to the exclusionary rule applied. (R., pp.118-31.) Ultimately,
the district court denied the motion to suppress. (R., pp.133-44.)
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Miramontes was charged with possessing both the methamphetamine discovered in her purse and
the methamphetamine found in the bedroom. (2/25/19 Tr., p.7, Ls.20-23; p.11, Ls.18-25.)
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Following mediation and pursuant to a plea agreement, Miramontes entered a conditional
guilty plea to the amended charge of possession of methamphetamine. (R., pp.147-48, 158-69;
11/22/19 Tr., p.20, L.20 – p.22, L.24; p.25, Ls.2-4.) She reserved the right to appeal the order
denying the motion to suppress. (R., p.162; 11/22/19 Tr., p.29, Ls.12-22.)
The district court imposed a unified sentence of three years, with two years fixed. (R.,
pp.182-85; 11/25/19 Tr., p.42, L.22 – p.43, L.4.) The court suspended execution of the sentence
and placed Miramontes on probation for three years. (Id.)
Miramontes timely appealed. (R., pp.182, 186-88.)
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ISSUE
Miramontes states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it denied Ms. Miramontes’s motion to suppress?
(Appellant’s brief, p.6.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Miramontes failed to show that the district court erred when it denied the motion to
suppress?

5

ARGUMENT
Miramontes Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred When It Denied The Motion To
Suppress
A.

Introduction
The district court held that Miramontes’s seizure did not violate the Fourth Amendment

and thus denied Miramontes’s motion to suppress. (R., pp.133-44. 3) On appeal, Miramontes
asserts the district court erred by denying her motion to suppress because the search of her purse
was unlawful. (Appellant’s brief, pp.7-11.) Her argument is unpreserved. She also asserts that
all evidence must be suppressed as the fruits of that unlawful search. (Appellant’s brief, pp.1316.) She is incorrect.
The district court properly denied the motion to suppress on the basis that Miramontes was
not unlawfully seized. Miramontes’s argument that the search of her purse was unlawful is not
preserved for appeal because she did not support such an assertion with any cogent argument or
authority below. Even if she did present some iteration of the argument she presents on appeal to
the district court, the argument is nevertheless unpreserved because she not obtain an adverse
ruling from the district court regarding the legality of the search. Even if Miramontes’s detention
or the search of her purse was unlawful, the evidence found in the bedroom she was staying in is
not subject to suppression as it would have been inevitably discovered by lawful means.

3

Although Miramontes contended that both constitutions were violated in her motion to suppress,
she has provided no argument why Article I, Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution should be applied
differently than the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. (R., pp.63-65, 73-82,
101-16; Appellant’s brief, pp.7-13.) Therefore, the Court should solely rely on judicial
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment in its analysis of Miramontes’s claims. See State v.
Reynolds, 143 Idaho 911, 914, 155 P.3d 712, 715 (Ct. App. 2007).
6

B.

Standard Of Review
“The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a

motion to suppress is challenged, the Court accepts the trial court’s findings of fact that are
supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the application of constitutional principles
to the facts as found.” State v. Moore, 164 Idaho 379, 381, 430 P.3d 1278, 1280 (2018) (quoting
State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 103 P.3d 454, 456 (2004)).
C.

The District Court Correctly Held That Miramontes Was Lawfully Seized
“The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects ‘[t]he right of the

people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures.’” State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 810, 203 P.3d 1203, 1209 (2009) (quoting U.S. Const.
amend. IV). “Like the Fourth Amendment, the purpose of Art. I, § 17 [of the Idaho Constitution]
is to protect Idaho citizens’ reasonable expectation of privacy against arbitrary governmental
intrusion.” State v. Albertson, 165 Idaho 126, 129, 443 P.3d 140, 143 (2019) (quoting State v.
Christensen, 131 Idaho 143, 146, 953 P.2d 583, 586 (1998)). Warrantless searches and seizures
are presumptively unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. State v. Wulff, 157 Idaho 416,
419, 337 P.3d 575, 578 (2014) (citations omitted).
Generally, “an official seizure of the person must be supported by probable cause, even if
no formal arrest is made” in order to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Michigan v.
Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 696 (1981) (citing Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 204 (1979)).
However, “some seizures significantly less intrusive than an arrest have withstood scrutiny under
the reasonableness standard embodied in the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 697 (citations omitted).
“In these cases the intrusion on the citizen’s privacy ‘was so much less severe’ than that involved
in a traditional arrest that ‘the opposing interest in crime prevention and detection and in police
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officer safety’ could support the seizure as reasonable.” Id. at 697-98 (quoting Dunaway, 442 U.S.
at 209).
Applying the foregoing principles, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a valid search warrant
“implicitly carries with it the limited authority [for law enforcement officers] to detain the
occupants of the premises [to be searched] while a proper search is conducted.” Summers, 452
U.S. at 705. In reaching its decision, the Court examined the character of the intrusion and its
justifications. Id. at 701-03. The Court concluded that when police officers are searching a house
pursuant to a valid search warrant, the detention of an occupant is minimally intrusive. Id. at 70102. The Court also recognized three legitimate justifications for such an intrusion: (1) the need to
prevent flight in the event incriminating evidence is found; (2) the interest in minimizing the risk
of harm to the officers; and (3) the orderly completion of the search. Id. at 702-03. Because the
intrusion on the citizen’s privacy is so much less severe than that involved in a traditional arrest,
such seizures are reasonable given the law enforcement interests. Summers, 452 U.S. at 704-05.
The Idaho Supreme Court recently extended the Summers rule to permit the limited
detention of the occupants of a home during a parole or probation search. State v. Phipps, 166
Idaho 1, 454 P.3d 1084 (2019). The Court determined that the intrusion caused by such detentions
is slight and that the governmental interests outlined in Summers apply with the same force to
parole and probation searches. Id. at ___-__, 454 P.3d at 1090-91. Accordingly, the Court held
that “officers have categorical authority to detain all occupants of a residence incident to a lawful
parole or probation search and to question them as long as the detention is not prolonged by the
questioning.” Id. at ___, 454 P.3d 1091.
Here, the district court correctly determined that Miramontes’s detention did not violate
the Fourth Amendment. It is undisputed that the probation officers had authority to enter and
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search Evans’s residence.

(Appellant’s brief, p.9; see also R., p.78.) Evans consented to

warrantless searches of her person, property, and residence as a condition of her participation in
mental health court. (State’s Ex. 1.) Additionally, Miramontes was inside Evans’s home when
the officers arrived (R., pp.133-34; 11/27/18 Tr., p.9, Ls.6-24), and she later admitted that she had
been living in a spare bedroom inside Evans’s home for several days before they arrived (R., p.134;
11/27/18 Tr., p.12, Ls.2-8; p.14, L.25 – p.15, L.9). Although Miramontes immediately fled out of
a back door, she obeyed Officer Myler’s order to stop and come back inside the home where she
was detained. (R., p.134; 11/27/19 Tr., p.10, Ls.24-25; p.17, Ls.4-12.) Because officers have
categorical authority to detain any occupants of a residence incident to a lawful probation search,
the probation officers did not violate Miramontes’s Fourth Amendment rights when they detained
her while conducting the search of Evans’s home. Therefore, the district court did not err when it
denied the motion to suppress on the grounds that Miramontes’s detention did not violate the
Fourth Amendment.
On appeal, Miramontes claims that she “does not challenge her warrantless, suspicionless
detention.” (Appellant’s brief, p.3 n.2.) She concedes that “Idaho case law has … affirmed the
constitutionality of [her] detention due to her presence at the home of … a probationer during a
routine probation search of the home.” (Appellant’s brief, pp.9-10 (citing Phipps, 166 Idaho 1,
454 P.3d 1084).) Nevertheless, she devotes several pages of her opening brief to the argument
that a seizure must be based on the reasonable suspicion that a particular individual is involved in
criminal activity and that flight alone is not a basis for reasonable suspicion. (Appellant’s brief,
pp.7-9.) To the extent she argues that the district court incorrectly held that her seizure was lawful,
proper application of Phipps shows that her argument is misplaced. The reasonableness standard
embodied in the Fourth Amendment is not violated when a third-party occupant of a residence is
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detained while officers conduct a probation search of the residence, regardless of whether the
officers have reasonable suspicion that the third party is involved in criminal activity. Phipps, 166
Idaho at ___-__, 454 P.3d at 1090-91. Miramontes has not argued that Phipps was wrongly
decided or shown that her detention was unlawful. Accordingly, she has failed to show that the
district court erred when it denied her motion to suppress on the grounds that her detention was
lawful.
D.

Miramontes’s Claim That Her Purse Was Unlawfully Searched Is Not Preserved
Miramontes asserts the district court erred when it denied her motion to suppress because

the search of her purse was illegal. (Appellant’s brief, pp.7-13.) Her argument is unpreserved.
Issues not raised below generally may not be considered for the first time on appeal. State
v. Fodge, 121 Idaho 192, 195, 824 P.2d 123, 126 (1992). “Appellate court review is limited to the
evidence, theories, and arguments that were presented below.” State v. Armstrong, 158 Idaho 364,
367, 347 P.3d 1025, 1028 (Ct. App. 2015) (emphasis added) (citing State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho
664, 670, 227 P.3d 918, 924 (2010)). A party may not claim the district court’s decision was in
error based on an argument that was not presented to the district court for its consideration. State
v. Demint, 161 Idaho 231, 233, 384 P.3d 995, 997 (Ct. App. 2016) (citing Armstrong, 158 Idaho
at 368, 347 P.3d at 1029); see
also -----------State v. Gonzalez, 165 Idaho 95, 99, 439 P.3d 1267, 1271
- --(2019) (“We will not hold that a trial court erred in making a decision on an issue or a party’s
position on an issue that it did not have the opportunity to address.”) “Even when a defendant
mentions the general basis for a motion to suppress, his or her arguments on appeal are limited by
what was argued to the trial court.” Demint, 161 Idaho at 233, 384 P.3d at 997 (citing State v.
Anderson, 154 Idaho 703, 705-06, 302 P.3d 328, 330-31 (2012)).
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Miramontes failed to present to the district court any cogent argument, backed by authority
and citations to evidence in the record, regarding the allegedly unlawful search of her purse. In
her motion to suppress, Miramontes asserted that the evidence should be suppressed on the sole
basis of “an illegal seizure.” (R., p.63 (emphasis added).) She did not assert on the face of the
motion that her constitutional rights were violated by an unlawful search. (R., pp.63-65.)
In her first brief in support of the motion to suppress, Miramontes made the bare assertion
for the first time that the search of her purse violated the Fourth Amendment. (R., p.75.) However,
she did not support this bare assertion with any authority, argument, or citation to the evidence in
the record. (R., pp.75-81.) She argued generally that her Fourth Amendment rights were violated
under the balancing test set forth in State v. Williams, 162 Idaho 56, 394 P.2d 99 (Ct. App. 2016).
(R., pp.75-81.) It appears she urged the district court to determine whether the “search of her
property was constitutionally permissible” using the Williams factors. (R., p.75.) However,
Williams is inapplicable to the determination of whether a search violates the Fourth Amendment.
See Williams, 162 Idaho at 60-64, 394 P.2d at 103-07 (holding that the detention of a third party
during the execution of an arrest warrant does not necessarily violate the Fourth Amendment).
Even Miramontes acknowledges on appeal that Williams is not relevant to a determination of
whether the purse was illegally searched. (Appellant’s brief, p.12.) Thus, in her first brief
Miramontes failed to support the bare assertion that her purse was unlawfully searched with any
relevant authority or argument.
If Miramontes’s intended to raise the argument she now asserts on appeal in her first brief,
it flew past both the district court and the state. During the second hearing on the motion to
suppress, which was held at the court’s request, defense counsel asserted that the officers “illegally
searched the purse.” (2/25/19 Tr., p.8, L.10 – p.10, L.1.) The court immediately responded, “And

11

see, this issue was not addressed in either one of your briefs.” (2/25/19 Tr., p.10, Ls.2-8.) Later,
Miramontes suggested for the first time that the officers needed consent to search her purse, which
caused the court to further express its confusion and request supplemental briefing from the parties.
(2/25/19 Tr., p.12, L.4 – p.15, L.20; p.19, Ls.6-7.)
Given the opportunity to provide additional briefing, Miramontes again made the bare
assertion that “the evidence obtained from Officer LaVallee’s search of the pink/salmon bag was
the product of an illegal search.” (R., p.102.) Yet, again she failed to provide any cogent argument
or relevant authority in support of this assertion. (R., pp.102-16.) Instead, she argued that the
evidence discovered in her purse and the evidence found in the bedroom should be suppressed
because neither the attenuation doctrine, nor the inevitable discovery doctrine, nor the independent
source doctrine applied. (Id.) Because she failed to support the bare assertion that the search of
her pink purse was unlawful with any argument or authority below, such arguments are not
preserved for appeal.
Moreover, even if some iteration of the argument Miramontes’s raises on appeal was made
below, she never secured an adverse ruling on the issue. “Even if an issue was argued to a lower
court, to preserve an issue for appeal there must be a ruling by the [lower] court.” Johnson v.
Crossett, 163 Idaho 200, 207, 408 P.3d 1272, 1279 (2018) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). This Court “will not review a trial court’s alleged error on appeal unless the record
discloses an adverse ruling which forms the basis for the assignment of error.” State v. Fisher, 123
Idaho 481, 485, 849 P.2d 942, 946 (1993). Here, the district court unambiguously ruled solely on
the legality of Miramontes’s seizure. (R., pp.136-43.) The district court ruled that “the detention
of the Defendant to confirm her identity was … constitutionally permissible.”

(R., p.143

(emphasis added).) The court did not address or rule on the legality of the search of Miramontes’s
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purse. (R., pp.136-43.) Therefore, the record does not contain an adverse ruling which forms the
basis for the assignment of error.
In sum, Miramontes’s failed to support the bare assertion that her purse was illegally
searched with any cogent argument or relevant authority, and the court did not address, much less
rule on, the legality of the search of her purse. Because appellate review is limited to the arguments
that Miramontes presented below, and because she failed to obtain an adverse ruling on the issue
of the alleged illegal search, the argument that the district court erred because the search of her
purse was illegal is not preserved for appeal.
E.

Regardless Of The Legality Of Either The Search Or The Seizure, The Evidence Found In
The Bedroom Is Not Subject To Suppression
Even assuming that Miramontes was unlawfully seized and/or her purse unlawfully

searched, the evidence found in the bedroom she was staying is not subject to suppression.
Generally, evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is subject to the exclusionary
rule. State v. Cohagan, 162 Idaho 717, 720, 404 P.3d 659, 662 (2017) (citing Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963); Page, 140 Idaho at 846, 103 P.3d at 459). The exclusionary rule
is a judicial remedy for addressing illegal searches and seizures. State v. Bunting, 142 Idaho 908,
915, 136 P.3d 379, 386 (Ct. App. 2006). The rule requires the suppression of “primary evidence
obtained as a direct result of an illegal search or seizure” as well as “evidence later discovered and
found to be derivative of an illegality or ‘fruit of the poisonous tree.’” Segura v. United States,
468 U.S. 796, 804 (1984) (citation omitted). “However, there are various exceptions to the
exclusionary rule.” Cohagan, 162 Idaho at 720-21, 404 P.3d at 662-63 (citations omitted).
One such exception is the inevitable discovery doctrine. “[T]he inevitable discovery
doctrine asks courts to engage in a hypothetical finding into the lawful actions law enforcement
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would have inevitably taken in the absence of the unlawful avenue that led to the evidence.” State
v. Downing, 163 Idaho 26, 31, 407 P.3d 1285, 1290 (2017) (emphasis in original) (citation
omitted). “The [inevitable discovery] doctrine ‘is not intended to swallow the exclusionary rule
whole by substituting what the police should have done for what they really did.’” Id. at 32, 407
P.3d at 1291 (quoting State v. Holman, 109 Idaho 382, 392, 707 P.2d 493, 503 (Ct. App. 1985)).
Rather, “[t]he inevitable-discovery doctrine presupposes parallel paths leading toward the
inevitable discovery of evidence.” State v. Maxim, 165 Idaho 901, 909, 454 P.3d 543, 551 (2019).
“If, because of illegal police action, one path arrives at the evidence before the other does, then the
State will be permitted to prove that the existing alternative path would have yielded the evidence
even if the existing alternative path was cut short due to the discovery of the evidence.” Id.
“However, the split in the investigation which creates these parallel paths must occur prior to or
independent of the illegality, not because of it.” Id. “The question is not what legal path the police
would have inevitably taken which could have yielded the evidence. The question is what legal
path the police actually took which would have inevitably yielded the evidence.” Id.
The inevitable discovery doctrine balances society’s interests in deterring illegal police
conduct and having juries receive all probative evidence of a crime by putting the government in
the same, not a worse, position than it would have occupied absent the police error or misconduct.
Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443 (1984). When evidence would have been inevitably discovered
as a result of other lawful means, the exclusion of such evidence would put the police in a worse
position than they would have been absent any error or misconduct, and thus the exclusionary rule
does not apply. Id. at 443-44. Hence, “the inevitable discovery doctrine allows for the admission
of evidence that would have been discovered even without the unconstitutional source.” Utah v.
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Streiff, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2061 (2016) (citation omitted); see
also --------Stuart v. State,
- --136 Idaho 490, 497-99, 36 P.3d 1278, 1285-87 (2001) (adopting the inevitable discovery doctrine).
In this case, the record establishes that the evidence discovered in the room Miramontes
was staying in would have been inevitably discovered by the probation officers during the
residence check regardless of Miramontes’s seizure or the search of her purse. The district court
found that the officers went to Evans’s home to conduct a probationary check, which authorized
the officers to verify Evans’s living arrangements, check for contraband, and confirm her
compliance with the terms and conditions of mental health court. (R., p.134; State’s Ex. 1.)
Officer Myler testified that it was standard policy for them to conduct such home checks every
thirty days when someone like Evans is on “phase one in a specialty court.” (11/27/18 Tr., p.34,
Ls.15-20.)
Officer Myler also testified that the purpose of the residence checks is to ensure that the
probationer is complying with the terms and conditions of their probation. (11/27/18 Tr., p.34,
L.21 – p.35, L.4.) The terms and conditions of Miramontes’s mental health agreement prohibited
her from having unapproved associations and from having guests in her home past 10 p.m. without
prior approval. (State’s Ex. 1.) Notwithstanding her assent to these terms, the officers observed
that Evans was violating them immediately upon entering her home. Officer Myler observed
Miramontes in the home despite the fact that Evans was not authorized to associate with her.
(11/27/18 Tr., p.9, Ls.6-24; p.37, Ls.18-24.) Additionally, before Officer LaVallee searched
Miramontes’s purse, Miramontes confessed to Officer Myler that she had been living at Evans’s
house for about a week. (11/27/18 Tr., p.12, Ls.2-8.) Thus, the officers knew Evans was not in
compliance with at least two terms of her agreement before Miramontes was seized and well before
Officer LaVallee opened Miramontes’s purse.
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Another condition of Evans’s agreement prohibited her from possessing controlled
substances. (State’s Ex. 1.) The observed violations surely elevated the officers’ pre-existing
concerns that someone on supervision, like Evans, may be possessing or using drugs. (See
11/27/18 Tr., p.34, L.5 – p.35, L.4.) Beyond that, Officer Myler testified that she wears gloves
during residence checks once they “start searching,” suggesting that searches for contraband are
characteristic of probationary checks and that the officers were going to search for contraband
during the residence check of Evans’s home. (11/27/18 Tr., p.31, L.25 – p.32, L.5.) Accordingly,
the officers would have searched Evans’s home for contraband as part of the routine residence
check they were conducting regardless of their detention of Miramontes or the search of her purse.
Suppressing the evidence found in the room Miramontes was staying in would put the state in a
worse, not the same, position than it would have been absent Miramontes’s detention or the search
of her purse. Because the evidence found in the bedroom would have been inevitably discovered,
it is not subject to suppression.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the judgement of conviction and the order
of the district court denying Miramontes’s motion to suppress.
DATED this 29th day of March, 2021.

/s/ Justin R. Porter
JUSTIN R. PORTER
Deputy Attorney General
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